Introduction
The recent literature suggests that forecasters may have incentives other than to produce the most accurate forecast possible. That is, the traditional assumption that the reported forecast has the minimum expected squared forecast error neglects other motivations that may also a¤ect the forecasters payo¤. As noted by Lamont (2002, p. 265) , for example, forecasters may set their forecasts to 'optimize pro…ts or wages, credibility, shock value, marketability, political power...' (see Laster, Bennett and Geoum (1999) and Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006) , inter alia). Some of the empirical literature on assessing the in ‡uence of reputation and related factors on the determination of agents'forecasts rests on the notion of herding -whether forecasters put undue weight on the views of others when they produce their forecasts, and either move their forecasts towards, or away from the consensus view.
It is clear that testing for herding behaviour is unlikely to be straightforward, as individuals' forecasts will tend to cluster together for reasons other than imitation e¤ects, including for example a sharing of common information about the likely future evolution of the variable of interest. Moreover, to the extent that the consensus forecast (or more generally, another individual's forecast) contains relevant information not possessed by a given forecaster, moving toward (or away from) the consensus forecast may be consistent with minimizing a traditional squared error loss function, and so does not constitute imitative behaviour. Hence care needs to be taken to ensure that the consensus calculated by the econometrician is in the individual agents'information sets. 1 In this paper we provide a critique of two approaches to testing for herding or antiherding. 2 The …rst includes a number of variants of an approach suggested by Gallo, Granger and Jeon (2002) (henceforth, GGJ) . Under one of these, imitation occurs when the revisions to …xed-event forecasts -the change from the h + 1-step ahead forecast of the target y t to the h-step ahead forecast of y t -are systematically related to the extent to which the h + 1-step ahead forecasts exceeds or falls short of the consensus view. If the change is in the 1 Some theoretical models of forecaster heterogeneity have the property that the consensus forecast will contain relevant information not possessed by the individual irrespective of the timing convention we adopt. In such models agents are assumed to pay no attention to the consensus view (or the views of others more generally) albeit that forecast accuracy would improve by doing so. We discuss such models when we analyze information rigidities as a possible source of forecaster disagreement.
2 'Anti-herding'refers to the behaviour of deliberately exaggerating the di¤erences between one's forecasts and those of others, while 'herding' has its natural interpretation. Throughout we will use 'imitative' behaviour to cover both herding and anti-herding. 2 direction of reducing the divergence between the forecaster's h + 1-forecast and the previous forecast, the forecaster is said to herd. If the forecaster positions himself further from (last period's) consensus they are said to anti-herd. Other variants do not explicitly consider the forecast revision, but are broadly similar. When we apply this approach to the forecasts of in ‡ation and real output growth made by the respondents to the US Survey of Professional Forecasters, we …nd around a half of all respondents are in ‡uenced by the forecasts of others:
whether they herd or anti-herd depends on the variant of the test used.
The second approach is based on Bernhardt, Campello and Kutsoati (2006) (henceforth, BCK) . Their approach supposes that if a forecaster's current reported forecast exceeds the consensus, then a forecaster who herds (anti-herds) will have moved his/her forecast towards (away from) the consensus, making it more likely that the error associated with that forecast will be positive (negative). The approach was developed in the context of assessing the behaviour of professional …nancial analysts, but has since been applied in a number of contexts (see, Pierdzioch, Rülke and Stadtmann (2010) and Pierdzioch and Rülke (2012) , inter alia).
The approach is generally used to assess all the forecasters en masse, although in principle it can be applied to individual forecasters, to allow for heterogeneity in that some forecasters may herd, others anti-herd, and others do neither. Because the test is non-parametric and relies on large-sample distributions of the test statistic, formal application of the approach to the relatively small samples of forecasts typically available for an individual forecaster may prove unreliable. However, we show that the test points toward anti-herding, as opposed to herding, in our sample of professional forecasters of in ‡ation and output growth.
In an attempt to understand these con ‡icting …ndings we present a simple model of a group of forecasters which allows for disparate private information and idiosyncratic reporting errors, but in which none of the forecasters pay attention to the views of others, that is, there is no imitation. The model captures the essential features of the forecasting environment in a stylized way, and is simple enough to allow us to relate the population values of the key parameters underpinning the tests in GGJ and BCK to the features of the environment. We show that the pattern of empirical results we obtain across the di¤erent tests is consistent with the forecasting environment being characterised by agents'forecasts primarily di¤ering because of idiosyncratic factors or reporting errors (as opposed to private information) and with little concerted imitative behaviour. We then consider how the tests perform when forecaster disagreement is driven by informational rigidities, as stressed in the 3 recent literature.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the tests of GGJ and BCK, and the related tests that we consider. Section 3 describes the forecast data we analyze for evidence of imitative behaviour, and section 4 records the results. Section 5 describes the model of forecaster heterogeneity we use to examine the properties of the tests, and assesses how well the analytical results match the empirical …ndings. Section 6 considers the e¤ects of di¤erent sources of forecaster heterogeneity, including types of information rigidities, on the outcomes of tests for imitative behaviour. Section 7 concludes.
2 Approaches to Testing for Herding Gallo et al. (2002) (GGJ) exemplify testing for herding based on the properties of successive individual forecasts of the same …xed event (y t ) and consensus forecasts of the same event.
Their test for imitation is based on the following regression 3 :
where y i tjt h denotes the forecast by individual i made at t h about y t , and a bar (and omission of the i-subscript) denotes a consensus forecast. (For simplicity, we omit the isubscript from the parameters). GGJ o¤er an alternative re-parameterisation, given by:
Based on (1) and (2), they argue that 1 is expected to be positive, 4 and that for an 'imitation e¤ect' we require 2 6 = 0, and for an imitation e¤ect and 'shrinkage to the mean' (i.e., herding), we require 2 6 = 0 and 2 = 1 + 2 1 < 0.
An alternative test for 'shrinkage to the mean'can be obtained by re-parameterising (1) 4 as:
and then imposing 1 + 2 1 = 0. Then a simple test for herding is whether y
is negatively correlated with y i tjt (h+1) y tjt (h+1) , so that if last quarter's forecast exceeds the consensus the current forecast is lowered relative to last period's. This corresponds to
While 1 < 0 indicates herding, 1 > 0 indicates anti-herding. Although the test of 1 in (4) has been derived from a restricted version of (1), it can also be motivated from testing for forecaster e¢ ciency in a …xed-event setting: see, e.g., Nordhaus (1987 ) and Clements (1995 , 1997 . Clearly, the future forecast revision y i tjt h y i tjt (h+1) (from the standpoint of the h + 1-step forecast y i tjt (h+1) ) should not be predictable from information available at that time if information is being used e¢ ciently.
These regressions require that y tjt (h+1) is known to each forecaster when they make their forecasts y i tjt (h+1) , which in turn requires that each forecaster knows the forecasts of the others at that point in time. Otherwise y tjt (h+1) will contain useful information about y t if the forecasters have private information. If that is the case, then the revision y will be systematically related to the explanatory variable, and the population values will be 2 6 = 0 and 1 6 = 0 even when forecasters do not imitate each other. Empirically, we can either take a stand on whether or not y tjt (h+1) 2 I i t (h+1) for all i (where I i t denotes individual i's information set at time t), or more pragmatically, we can report results for di¤erent assumptions about agents' information sets. For example, instead of (4) we can estimate:
where y tjt (h+1) has been replaced by y tjt (h+2) . The only information requirement is that forecasters know the forecasts of others made in the previous period.
Although each forecaster may not know the current forecasts of all the others, it may be reasonable to assume that professional forecasters e¤ectively have this information assuming they are cognizant of the prevailing view of the forecasting community about the outlook for key macro-aggregates such as GDP growth and in ‡ation. Hence we may proceeds as if they knew the current consensus. The conservative approach of using the lagged consensus y tjt (h+2) perhaps assumes too little -that a forecaster's view of the consensus is anchored to what it was a quarter of a year ago.
The second approach to testing for imitation considers the forecast errrors, for example:
Equation (6) is a regression-based implementation of the non-parametric test of Bernhardt et al. (2006) , who suppose that the reported forecast of a respondent will be moved towards the consensus relative to the respondent's private forecast when a respondent herds. 5 Hence if the private h-step forecast exceeded the h + 1-step consensus, the reported forecast y i tjt h will still exceed consensus, but if the private forecast was an unbiased forecast, the reported forecast will fall short of the outcome on average. Consequently, we would expect to see a positive association between the LHS and RHS variables, and 1 > 0. When the reported forecast is moved further from the consensus relative to the private forecast, the respondent is said to exaggerate his/her di¤erences, or anti-herd.
The non-parametric test of Bernhardt et al. (2006) is based on the sum of two conditional probabilities: the probability that the reported forecast exceeds the outcome conditional on the forecast exceeding the consensus, CP 1 = Pr y t < y i tjt h j y tjt (h+1) < y i tjt h , and the probability that the reported forecast is less than the outcome conditional on the forecast being less than the consensus, CP 2 = Pr y t > y 
This is asymptotically normally distributed N 0:5; We call forecasts of the current-quarter 8 horizon h = 1 forecasts. Then we have 4 separate sets of pairs of forecasts of the same event: the h = 2 and h = 1 forecasts, the h = 3 and h = 2 forecasts, the h = 4 and h = 3 forecasts, and …nally, the h = 5 and h = 4 forecasts. This seems preferable to using a vintage from many years later as this will typically contain 6 It began life as began as the NBER-ASA survey in 1968:4, and since June 1990 has been run by the Philadelphia Fed, renamed as the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF): see Zarnowitz (1969) and Croushore (1993) .
7 Prior to 1981:3 the point predictions for output referred to nominal output, but a series for real output has been imputed (by the Philadelphia Fed) from the forecasts of nominal output and the de ‡ator. Some experimentation suggested the results are qualitatively unchanged if we only use the surveys from 1981:Q3 onwards.
8 That is, a forecast of 2012:Q1 made in response to the 2012:Q1 survey. This is termed 1-step, because when the forecast of the survey-quarter value is made the most recent GDP growth and (GDP de ‡ator) in ‡ation …gures will be the advance estimates of the previous quarter. 7 revisions and de…nitional changes (see e.g., Landefeld, Seskin and Fraumeni (2008) for a discussion of the revisions to US national accounts data). Table 1 reports the evidence for imitation based on equations (1) and (2) from the approach suggested by Gallo et al. (2002) . We assume that at time t each individual knows the consensus forecast based on the forecasts made at time t by all the other forecasters. We run regressions (1) and (2) on all the forecasts of a given horizon for each individual who reported a su¢ cient number of forecasts. 9 We report the proportion of regressions for which i) we rejected the null that 2 = 0 in eqn. (1), (ii) we rejected the null that 2 = 0 (in eqn.
Empirical Findings
(1)) and 2 = 0 (in eqn. (2)) in favour of 2 6 = 0 and 2 < 0, and (iii) 2 = 0 against 2 6 = 0 (in eqn. (2)). 10 The results indicate an imitation e¤ect ( 2 6 = 0) for in excess of two-…fths of the forecasters for in ‡ation, and for a third to one half for output growth. However, the results of (ii) indicate that rarely do we …nd herding as de…ned by Gallo et al. (2002) ( 2 6 = 0 and 2 < 0). Moreover, (iii) indicates that 2 = 0 is rejected for relatively few forecasters.
The …ndings are little a¤ected by the forecast horizon. Recall that the results for h = 1 are based on the revision between the forecasts of the current survey quarter value, and the forecasts of that target made in the previous survey. The results for h = 2 relate to the forecasts of the next quarter, and the forecast of that quarter made in the previous quarter, and so on. Table 1 provides evidence of imitation ( 2 6 = 0) but little evidence of herding ( 2 6 = 0 and 2 < 0). Table 2 reports the results of tests based on restricted versions of (1) and (2), such as (4). It gives: (i) the rejection frequency of a one-sided test of 1 = 0 versus 1 < 0 (indicating herding), (ii) the rejection frequency of 1 = 0 versus 1 > 0 (signifying antiherding), and (iii) the proportion for which neither is found. The remaining three columns record the average S statistic values (7) across all those respondents for which we found 1 < 0, 1 > 0 and neither, where the average is the median. We …nd that 1 = 0 is rejected in favour of 1 < 0 for around three quarters of forecasters, for each horizon, for in ‡ation, whereas for output growth the proportion is a little lower at 9 We require 10 or more forecasts of a given horizon. This reqirement was satis…ed by around 150 individuals for each horizon.
10 All tests were undertaken at the 5% level, including each of the two tests under (ii).
the shortest horizon. There are virtually no instances where 1 = 0 is rejected in favour of 1 > 0. There does not appear to be a systematic relationship between …nding herding based on 1 < 0 and a low value of S. For both variables the median value of S is similar for those forecasters for which we reject 1 = 0 in favour of 1 < 0, and for those forecasters for whom we fail to reject 1 = 0.
We report the results of tests based on (6) in table 3. When we reject 1 = 0 it is mostly in the direction of 1 < 0. This occurs for around half of the in ‡ation forecasters, and around one third of the output growth forecasters. This evidence of anti-herding is backed up by the estimates of S (eqn. (7)), which exceed one half for in excess of 80% of forecasters for in ‡ation, with only slightly lower proportions for the output growth forecasts. The nonparametric test S generates fewer rejections of the null than the regression implementation (see the last column of the table).
The t-tests of 1 > 1 in table 3 are based on autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors because of the usual issue of overlapping forecasts, whereas for h = 1 only a correction for heteroscedasticity is made. The tests in tables 1 and 2 require only a correction for possible heteroscedasticity, even for h > 1. To understand why this is the case, consider for example two adjacent observations on the left-hand-side of (4):
Under the null the revisions are serially uncorrelated, even for h = 1.
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In sum, between a half and three quarters of all SPF respondents appear to herd if we consider individual-level regressions of forecast revisions on the di¤erence between last period's forecast and the consensus forecast. Radically di¤erent …ndings result from tests on the GGJ regression values of 2 and 2 , or compared to the evidence for anti-herding based on the approach of Bernhardt et al. (2006) . Table 4 records the key …ndings when we instead use the lagged consensus (as in (5) and suitably adapted versions of (1) and (2)) re ‡ecting the more conservative assumption that at time t forecasters only know the t 1 consensus.
12 Generally there is less evidence of 11 This follows immediately if we consider a time series x t which can be written as
we have x t 1;t 1 h x t 1;t 1 (h+1) = h " t 1 h , and so Cov x tjt h x tjt (h+1) ; x t 1;t 1 h x t 1;t 1 (h+1) = 0. 12 In these implementations, we lose the 'h = 4'results, as these would require h = 6 forecasts, and the longest quarterly forecasts in the SPF are h = 5. 9 imitative behaviour -which is of course consistent with last quarter's consensus constituting out-dated information which has less in ‡uence on forecaster behaviour. That said, the results are qualitatively unchanged in that: i) tests based on (5) continue to suggest herding (around 60% of in ‡ation forecasters herd, with smaller numbers for output growth), and ii) tests based on GGJ ( 2 and 2 ) suggest a …fth to a third of forecasters imitate, but that few of these herd. There is no need to consider a lagged version of BCK because the implementation reported in the tables already has the consensus lagged one quarter relative to the individual forecast being analyzed.
Hence the information assumption does not drive the divergent …ndings apparent in tables 1, 2 and 3. Under the conservative assumption, the results based on the forecast revision (equation (5)) suggest around a half of forecasters herd, and those based on GGJ suggest little herding behaviour. Those based on BCK point towards anti-herding.
A Simple Model of Forecaster Heterogeneity
In an attempt to understand the con ‡icting empirical …ndings in section 4, we consider a model of heterogeneous forecasters, in which there is private information, and forecaster reporting error or noise. In section 6 we discuss the implications of recent models that emphasise informational rigidities.
Actual and forecast data generating processes
We extend the simple model of Engle (1983) to allow for idiosyncratic error or reporting error. Engle (1983) used the following model to analyze the relationship between the crosssection variance of heterogeneous expectations and ARCH estimates of uncertainty, but it will also serve as the foundation of our model. The variable y t is generated by a …rst-order autoregressive process:
but each of the N forecasters is privy to private information, so that the 'shock'w t can be decomposed as w t = t + P i=1 i " i;tjt 1 , and it is assumed that " i;tjt 1 is known by i when forecasting y t at time t 1. So i's forecast is given by y i tjt 1 = y t 1 + i " i;tjt 1 , where we assume E " 2 i;tjt 1 = 1 for all i, which is without loss of generality given that the "'s are multiplied by the i 's. We also assume that the "'s are serially uncorrelated, are uncorrelated across individuals at all leads and lags, and are uncorrelated with the 's at all leads and lags.
The recent modelling of three-dimensional panels of forecasters 13 suggests a role for an idiosyncratic error in explaining forecaster behaviour. We add an error which is speci…c to the forecaster i, the target t, and the forecast horizon h. For 1-step ahead, i's forecasts are given by:
where E v 2 i;tjt 1 = 1 all i. By backward iteration of (8) we obtain:
Then the h-step ahead forecast of y t by individual i is given by their conditional expectation of y t given the available information, plus the idiosyncratic error or 'noise', i v i;tjt h , i.e.,
The individual's information set I i t h contains public information y t h and private information i " i;t h+1jt h . Then the forecast is given by:
The consensus forecast is assumed to be the simple average of the individual forecasts. Hence:
In this model, y tjt h = 2 I i t h , because I i t h does not include i " j;t h+1jt h j = 1; : : : ; N except for j = i. This means that when testing for imitation using (1), (2) We consider h = 1 in the analysis below to make matters concrete, but the analysis holds for any h.
The 1-step forecast is given by (9), and the 2-step and 3-step ahead forecasts from (10) as:
and:
The consensus forecasts are the cross-section average of (12) when we consider tests based on (1), (2) or (4). 
Population values
In the Appendix we calculate the relevant moments for the model in section 5.1 and show that:
where we have made the simplifying assumptions that i) N is large and ii) the news component is approximately equal across forecasters, and i = = p N , so that the importance of news ( 2 i ) for each individual is inversely related to the number of forecasters. This assumption ensures that the relative magnitudes of the components t and P i=1 i " i;tjt 1 of 12 the overall variance of w t remain …xed as N increases.
From (14) it is apparent that 1 < 1 0, and will equal zero when the reporting error is zero. Alternatively, if the variance of the reporting error is large relative to the average news or the variance of the underlying shocks, 1 will tend to 1.
We can investigate the implications of falsely assuming the forecasters know the forecasts of others. In our framework, this amounts to running the regression (4) instead of (5). Then the population value of 1 in (4) is:
so that assuming forecasters known more than they do will manifest as herding behaviour.
Gallo et al. (2002) approach
Next, consider the approach of GGJ. For the setup in section 5.1, we need to amend (1) and (2) to:
Then in the Appendix we show that under the simplifying assumptions we have made we obtain:
Suppose we incorrectly use y tjt 2 in these regressions, and estimate 2 in (16) and 2 in (17). Then we can show that:
Thus the incorrect informational assumption results in e 2 being non-zero and positive even in the absence of individual idiosyncratic errors, although e 2 ' 0. Hence the GGJ approach is also susceptible to indicating imitative behaviour when we mistakenly assuming forecasters 13 know more about the forecasts of others than they do.
Bernhardt et al. (2006) approach
Consider the regression equivalent of Bernhardt et al. (2006) .
Straightforward calculations result in:
A re-consideration of the empirical results
The results in section 5.2 suggest that in the absence of private information (so that forecaster disagreement is driven solely by idiosyncratic reporting errors):
and will be close to 1 if 4 2 is small relative to
so that 2 will be of equal size but the opposite sign to 1 , and 2 will be close to zero; and,
so that 1 < 1 < 1 < 0 (because the implicit assumption that y t is integrated of order zero implies that 1 < < 1).
On the other hand, when the di¤erences between forecasters are solely due to private information (and reporting errors are absent), it follows immediately from the expressions in section 5.2 that none of the approaches will suggest imitative behaviour, provided the consensus forecast is appropriately de…ned (i.e., such that it is known to all).
Recall that 1 < 0 ( 1 > 0) indicates herding (anti-herding), while 1 < 0 ( 1 > 0)
indicates anti-herding (herding). Conditional on 2 6 = 0, 2 < 0 indicates herding. Thus 14 the pattern of results in section 4 -namely, herding based on equation (5), evidence of imitative behaviour based on 2 6 = 0 but little evidence of 2 < 0 (GGJ approach), and antiherding from BCK -is consistent with an absence of herding behaviour 14 and the di¤erences between forecasters primarily re ‡ecting 'noise'or reporting errors, as opposed to information that would reduce forecast error.
Alternative models of forecaster heterogeneity
In our simple model forecaster disagreement can be driven by private information or noise.
A key distinction between the two is of course that the former is consistent with forecaster e¢ ciency, in the sense that the forecasts are uncorrelated with the forecast errors, 15 whereas noise results in forecasts which violate this property. For example, the 1-step ahead forecast error is:
so that:
which is zero in the absence of noise. The model of Davies and Lahiri (1995) only allows forecasters to disagree because of …xed individual-speci…c biases and 'idiosyncratic errors', where the latter correspond to our v i;tjt h . Davies and Lahiri (1995, p. 209) suggest that these capture ''other factors'(e.g., private information, measurement error, etc.) ' but notice they cannot be interpreted as private information in their setup, as commonly understood, because they are correlated with the forecast errors.
Over the last decade or so a number of models have been proposed to explain forecaster heterogeneity, some of which suppose the existence of informational rigidities. In this section we explore the implications of these models for testing for forecaster herding. When these theoretical models can be mapped into private information or idiosyncratic errors, the implications for testing for herding follow immediately. Section 6.1 and 6.2 consider two types of information rigidities, section 6.3 forecaster heterogeneity due to agents having di¤erent loss functions, and section 6.4 heterogeneity arising from forecasters having di¤erent priors.
Information Rigidities I: Sticky Information
We begin with the …rst of two models of informational rigidities: sticky information. See inter alia Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers (2003) , and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) . Sticky information assumes that in each period, each agent updates their information (relative to the previous period) with probability 1 . When they do update, they acquire full information, and form expectations rationally. Working backwards, a proportion of the pool of forecasters will not use the latest information, and of these, a fraction 1 will have updated in the previous period, and so on. Hence in terms of forecasting y t h-steps ahead, the mean forecast across individuals is given by:
where E y t j I i t s is the full-information rational expectations forecast made at time t s (where s h).
It might appear that sticky information is akin to forecasters possessing private information, with the immediate implication that forecaster heterogeneity due to sticky information will not falsely show up as imitative behaviour using the tests described in section 2. To see why, notice that a proportion (1 ) of forecasters use the information set I i t h = fy t h ; y t h 1 ; : : :g, a proportion (1 ) use the information set I i t (h+1) = fy t h 1 ; : : :g etc., so that the …rst group can be thought of as possessing 'private information'y t h , relative to the second, and so on. Knowledge of y t h is clearly information in that it reduces forecast error assuming y t follows an autoregression. However also relevant is whether the consensus forecast used in the herding test provides useful information compared to the longer-horizon individual forecast. If we allow that individuals are heterogeneous in terms of the frequency with which they update their forecasts, and consider an individual with a high (i.e., low average frequency of updating), then the mean forecast will contain useful information and the herding test will typically indicate imitative behaviour (as shown by the results for e 1 and e 2 in section 5.2).
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Information Rigidities II: Noisy Information
The second model of informational rigidities assumes agents base their forecasts on the latest information, but only ever observe noisy signals about economic fundamentals: see Woodford (2001), Sims (2003) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) , inter alia. Unlike sticky information models, agents are assumed to base their forecasts on the latest information, but this never reveals fundamentals (such as the in ‡ation rate and real output growth).
The model in Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) assumes an AR(1) process for the unobserved state variable:
and that each agent receives a signal common to all as well as a speci…c signal, i.e., z it = [s it , s t ] 0 where:
The agent makes optimal forecasts of y t h-steps ahead given his assumed information set, i.e., y i tjt h = E y t j z it h ; z it (h+1) ; : : : , and also z i tjt h = E z it j z it h ; z it (h+1) ; : : : . Using the Kalman …lter, it follows that:
where H = [1 1] 0 , and P = [P ; P v ] is the gain of the …lter.
The forecasters have private information, in the form of private signals, but notice that the consensus forecast will always contain valuable information relative to an individual's longer-horizon forecasts used in the herding tests, so that noisy information will (wrongly)
show up as imitative behaviour. This is a consequence of the assumption that each forecaster i's information set consists only of his set of signals fz it ; z it 1 ; : : :g. Both contemporaneous
and lagged forecasts of others contain useful information.
One could envisage 'private'forecasts being based on private signals, as in (19), but suppose that professional forecasters would not forego the opportunity to improve forecast accuracy by 'adapting'their forecasts to the consensus, or lagged consensus. However, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) …nd that the noisy information model generally does a good job of explaining the observed responses of mean in ‡ation forecast errors and disagreement to shocks for professional forecasters (as well as for other agents).
We calculate the population value of 1 for regression equation (5) 
Note that P H 2 (0; 1), and that the degree of information rigidity declines as P H ! 1 (because more weight is placed on z it , and consequently the innovation in the in ‡ation process w t ). Hence (20) indicates that the false rejection of the null of no imitation will be exacerbated the lower the degree of information rigidity. Intuitively, individual forecasters are placing more weight on their private signals, y it , so the consensus forecast which aggregates the private information is a more valuable predictor of in ‡ation, and so y i tjt 1 y i tjt 2 is more highly correlated with y i tjt 2 y tjt 2 . The expression (21) using the t 3-consensus becomes more interpretable if we assume only private signals (that is, we abstract form the common signal s t ). This amounts to setting P v = P , H = 1, P 2 = 0, 2 = 0. In that case:
Again, P 2 (0; 1), and with low informational rigidity 1 < 0, as when the current consensus is used. Only when the private signal is noiseless ( 2 v = 0) so that all observe y t will 1 equal zero, but in this case there is no heterogeneity. Capistrán and Timmermann (2009) where for ' i > 0, loss is approximately linear for e < 0 ('over-predictions'), and exponential for e > 0, ('under-predictions') . Suppose in ‡ation is conditionally Gaussian (i.e., given information in the previous period ), y tjt 1 N tjt 1 ; 2 tjt 1 , then it follows that the optimal predictor for agent i is given by:
Heterogeneous degrees of loss asymmetry
Hence even full-information rational expectations forecasters will make biased forecasts and will disagree in terms of their reported forecasts. Optimal forecasts under heterogeneous degrees of loss asymmetry will manifest as forecasts with idiosyncratic errors or reporting errors, when evaluated using a squared error loss function, so will tend to (falsely) indicate imitative behaviour.
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6.4 Heterogeneous beliefs about long-run outcomes Timmermann (2010, 2011) suggest the observed disagreement among forecasters may in part re ‡ect the in ‡uence of di¤erent views about the long-run values of variables like in ‡ation and output growth. Suppose that agent i's forecast based on recent information is E y t j I i t 1 , and we can sharpen the analysis by assuming, say E y t j I i t 1 = tjt 1 , for all i. But this is weighted by each forecaster with their prior for the long-run growth rate, i , to give agent i's reported forecast as:
The cross-sectional distribution of i 's will again show up as idiosyncratic errors or reporting errors, and as suggested by the analysis in section 5, may (falsely) indicate imitative behaviour.
Conclusions
There is much interest in the literature in whether forecasters report their 'best'forecasts, where best is narrowly de…ned to mean most accurate, or whether forecasters are unduly in ‡uenced by others, as might be the case if their payo¤s depend on the positioning of their forecasts in relation to the forecasts of others. A natural way of making this idea testable is via the notion of herding or anti-herding, and to consider whether the changes in an individual's forecasts of y t are systematically related to the past consensus. It is important that the past consensus is known to the individual, otherwise it would typically constitute a useful source of information and would in ‡uence the forecasts of a forecaster solely motivated by maximizing forecast accuracy.
We consider approaches to testing forecaster herding based on this and related ideas, and …nd that a signi…cant proportion of professional US macroeconomists appear to be in ‡uenced by their fellow forecasters, but that some approaches suggest respondents deliberately exaggerate their di¤erences, while others suggest herding is the dominant type of imitative behaviour. We use a simple model of forecaster heterogeneity to show that if di¤erences amongst forecasters primarily arise because of private information, then imitative behaviour will not be ‡agged when forecasts do not imitate. However, if di¤erences arise because of noise or reporting errors, then all the tests will suggest imitative behaviour even when it is absent. Note that noise can be understood in a wide sense of denoting di¤erences which are not attributable to news or information: formally, components of forecasts which are perfectly correlated with the forecast error.
The pattern of empirical results we obtain across the di¤erent tests of herding is shown to be consistent with di¤erences between forecasters arising primarily from idiosyncratic factors or reporting errors rather than imitative behaviour.
We consider a number of models of forecaster heterogeneity which have recently been proposed, including various informational rigidities and di¤erences in loss functional and priors concerning long-run values of variables. Informational rigidities will tend to show up 20 as herding because the consensus forecast -assumed absent from individuals' information sets -constitutes useful information for predicting the object of interest. The recent empirical support for the noisy information model reported by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) suggests the tests for herding we analyze may falsely signal herding when in fact noisy information is the explanation. It is also straightforward to show that forecaster heterogeneity arising from forecasters with loss functions characterized by di¤ering degrees of asymmetry, as well as forecasts which incorporate di¤erent prior beliefs, may falsely indicate imitative behaviour. The test regressions are:
The entries in the table are the proportion of regressions for which the null is rejected in favour of the speci…ed alternative. The test regression is:
The entries in the table are the proportion of regressions for which the null is rejected in favour of the speci…ed alternative. The test regression is: 
The entries in the table are the proportion of regressions for which the null is rejected in favour of the speci…ed alternative.
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Test of forecast revisions
The population value of the slope parameter 1 in:
is de…ned by: 
We have:
and substituting for y t 1 y t 2 from y t = y t 1 + t + P i=1 i " i;tjt 1 gives:
1
The term y i tjt 2 y tjt 3 can be written as:
Assuming that the "'s, v's and 's are independent at all leads and lags, and V ar (") = 1 and V ar (v) = 1 for all i, t, we obtain:
The denominator in (2) is:
where the second line assumes i) N is large and ii) the news component is approximately equal across forecasters, and i = = p N , which we assume throughout. Hence we drop terms which are of order 
When we falsely assume y tjt 2 is in the forecasters' information sets, the population value of the slope parameter 1 is:
The forecast revision is given by (3), and y i tjt 2 y tjt 2 can be written as:
2 so that the numerator of e 1 is:
The denominator in (5) is:
Hence:
GGJ tests of imitation
The tests are based on:
y i tjt 1
where relative to GGJ we have lagged the consensus forecast by an extra period because of the assumed information structure.
Consider generic regression, y = + 1 x + 2 z + error. Then:
Consider 2 in (7).
To calculate (9) the following moments are required:
where C ij = Cov (y t i ; y t j ) ;
Substitution into (9) gives:
Dropping terms which vanish in N :
4 Consider 2 in (8). Using the generic regression, y = + 1 x + 2 z + error, let:
Then the required moments are:
and substitution into the expression for 2 gives:
i . Dropping terms 1=N and smaller:
When the GGJ tests incorrectly use as the consensus forecasts y tjt 2 , the population value of 2 is given by (9):
where y, x and z are:
The required moments are:
Substitution into (10) gives:
Dropping terms which vanish in N : with the relevant moments given by:
Dropping terms 1=N and smaller, we …nd: The moments are:
and dropping terms of order (1 P H) k k P Hy t k + P v v i t k + P t k
from which the consensus forecast follows directly as:
because the cross-sectional average of the v i t is assumed to be zero. Hence (1 P H) k k P Hy t j k + P v v i t j k + P t j k we obtain:
(1 P H) k k P Hy t 3 k + P t 3 k
and thus:
V ar y i tjt 2 y tjt 3 = 4 h 1 (1 P H) 
Using expressions (17) and (16) 
